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Election Rights of a Surviving
Spouse in Ohio
Robert C. Bensing
T HE PUR osE of this artide is to provide an up-to-date-review and analy-
sis of the case and statutory law governing in Ohio the rights of a surviving
spouse in the property of a deceased consort dying with a will.
In all instances where property is disposed of by. will, the devisees or
legatees must either elect to take under the will or disaffirm its provisions in
entirety. Also, an election must be made by the surviving spouse where,
as in Ohio, the surviving spouse is given the right to receive dower or some
type of forced statutory share in the estate of the decedent instead of simply
accepting the provisions of
his will or else rejecting
THE AUTHOR (A.B., 1943, LL.B., 1947, Uni- them and receiving noth-
versity of Louisville; LL.M., 1948, J. S. D., ing at all
1950, Yale University) is an Assistant Profes-
sor of Law at Western Reserve Umversity and General Nature of the
a member of the Kentucky Bar. Right of Electon
The doctrine of election
as applied to matters testa-
mentary, while governed by statute," is m theory based upon the equtable
principle that one cannot accept the benefits of an instrument and at the
same time repudiate the obligations imposed upon him by asserting daims
wholly inconsistent with the donor's intent as evidenced by the granting
document.2
In regard to a relict spouse, the election given by a statute is simply a
choice between rights and the amount of property conferred by will and
the property given the spouse by law.8
Who May Elect
The Ohio Supreme Court has declared that the right of a surviving
spouse to elect whether to take under the will or against it is a personal right
'OHIo Gm. CODE §§ 10504-55, 10504-60, 10504-61.
2., The doctrine of election is the peculiar subject of the jurisdiction of courts of
equity. It is a creature of equity, although regulated by statute as to time, place,
manner, requisites and effect of the election." Hibbs v. Insurance Co., 40 Ohio St.
543, 554 (1884); Ambrose v. Rugg, Admx., 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N.E. 691(1931). The doctrine has been assumed to have been derived from the Roman
or civil law. See: 3 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1454 (14th ed. 1918).
OHso GEN. CODE § 10504-55.
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that can be exercised by the spouse alone.4 The legislature has effectively
precluded any other interpretation of the nature of such right through the
passage of Ohio General Code Section 10504-56, which requires that the
election be made = pei-son, and through Section 10504-60, which provides
that:
If the surviving spouse fails to make such election before the expiration
of the time limit provided by law without having made such an election,
such spouse shall be conclusively presumed to have elected to take under
the will and persons may deal with the property of the decedent in ac-
cordance therewith.
This proposition is, however, subject to qualification. Ohio General
Code Section 10504-63 states that:
When because of unsound mind, or other legal disability, the surviving
spouse is unable to make an election, as soon as the facts come to the knowl-
edge of the probate court, at any time within the time allowed by law for
election, it shall appoint some suitable person to ascertain the value of the
provision made for such spouse in lieu of the provisions made by law, and
the value of the rights by law in the estate of the deceased consort.
And Ohio General Code Section 10504-64 provides that:
On the return of the report of the person appointed to make such in-
vestigation, the court shall determine whether the provision made by the
testator for the surviving spouse, in the will, or the provision by law, is
better for such spouse, and shall elect accordingly.
Although the reference to mental incompetency in the first section5 is
self-explanatory, the phrase "or other legal disability" is not. As defined
by the legislature by an act passed the same day,6 however, the phrase in-
cludes not only persons of unsound mind, persons under guardianship, and
minors-again terms that are self-explanatory - but also "persons in
captivity."
'
While it is assumed that an inmate of a penitentiary or other penal
institution, would be "a person in captivity" and thus fall within the statute,
it does not necessarily follow that the phrase is limited to such persons, for it
would appear to apply as well to anyone held in confinement or made
prisoner, for whatever reasons, as for example, a prisoner of war. Whether
the intent of the legislature was to provide for such a broad coverage is
not known, but, due to the nature of the problem involved, it would seem
that an interpretation that would favor the interests of the relict would be
'Millikin v. Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460 (1882) The election statutes under which
this conclusion was reached were-with the exception of the express inclusion of
the conclusive presumption in case of death found in Ohio General Code Section
10504-60, as effective in 1947 -identical with the current provisions concerning
the nature of the right to elect.
'OHIO GEN. CODE § 10504-63.
6 Both OHio GEN. CODE §§ 10504-63 and 10512-2 became effective January 1,
1932.
7 OHio GBN. CODE § 10512-2.
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more indicative. of the possible legislative intent than any other. Until
judicial interpretation is made, however, any comment is nothing more
than speculation.
Once the facts are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under
Section 10504-63,1 the question arises whether anything short of the re-
moval of the disability before an election has been entered9 would divest
the court of its discretionary powers to elect either in favor of or against
the will. The problem could arise only in the event of the death of the
spouse before an election by the court has been perfected.
In such a case, the issue becomes that of whether Section 10504-63
governs the situation in respect to the incompetent spouse, thereby making
inability to make the election the factor of controlling importance, or
whether the conclusive presumption of election to take under the will in
event of the death of the relict spouse, as set out in Section 10504-60, is
paramount and applies to an incompetent as well as a competent spouse.
In 1882, in Milikm v. Weaver,"0 a case involving a competent spouse,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the right to elect was a personal one that
could be exercised by the spouse alone, and that if she died within the
time permitted for election, without making an election, the effect was
the same as if she had lived and failed to elect within the period allowed.
The case is cited and felt significant for the reason that when it was decided
there was no code provision expressly creating a presumption of election
in case of death as does the current Code." By judicial decision, therefore,
the same result was reached as that effected by statute today.
In 1931, the case of Ambrose v. Rugg, Admx., 2 presented for the first
time the problem of the death of an mncompetent spouse within the time
allowed for election to be made by the court under a statute comparable to
Section 10504-63 of the present Code.13
'Not only must the relict spouse be of unsound mind or under other legal disability
before the court can act under Ohio General Code Sections 10504-63 and 10504-64,
but also the fact of the disability must come to the knowledge of the court within
the time limits set by Ohio General Code Section 10504-55. In re Estate of Iwinski,
83 Ohio App. 463, 77 N.E.2d 375 (1947).
'Once an election has been made and entered upon the journal by the court, the re-
moval of the disability should not affect the court's election, for Ohio General Code
Section 10504-64 provides that such election " shall have the same force and
effect as an election made by one not under such disability."
037 Ohio St. 460 (1882).
"See OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-60. At the time of the Millikm case the Code
merely stated: "If the widow shall fail to make such election, she shall retain her
dower, and such share of the personal estate of her husband as she would be entitled
to by law, in case her husband had died intestate leaving children " Omo REV.
STAT. § 5964 (1880).
' 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N.E. 691 (1931)
"OmIo GEN. CODE § 10574 (1931). 'When, because of unsound mind, the
1950]
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The court recognized the principle laid down in the Millikm case, supra,
but declared that:
The provisions of Section 10571, General Code,"' that if the widow or
widower fails to make election as provided within the time specified, it
shall be deemed that he or she has elected to take under the will, have no
application in a case where the widow was mentally incompetent at the
time of the death of the testator and continued in such condition until her
death two months later.
The decision was based upon the principle that the doctrine of election
grew up independently of statute in equity and that surely the hand of equity
may intervene in a proper case, such as the one presented.'
In the light of these two cases and the statutes under which they were
decided, one might assume that since the current statute' O differs in appli-
cation to the problem only to the extent that it expressly provides that if
the relict spouse " dies before the expiration of the time limit provided
by law without having made such election, such spouse shall be conclusively
presumed to have elected to take under the will " the problem would be
decided under the present statutes' 7 in exactly the same way as decided by
the Ambrose case in 1931.
However, when the problem was presented to the Ohio Supreme Court
in 1944, in It re Estate of Knofler,'i in construing Section 10504-60 and
its death provision" in connection with Sections 10504-63 and 10504-64,
the court held the conclusive presumption of the death statute superior.
The court recognized the merits of the holding in Ambrose v. Rugg,
widow or widower of a testator is unable to make an election, as soon as the facts
come to the knowledge of the probate court, at any time within one year after the
testator's death, it shall appoint some suitable person to ascertain the value of the
provision made for such widow or widower in lieu of the provisions made by law,
and the value of the rights by law in the estate of the deceased consort."
And Ohio General Code Section 10575 provided that: "If, on the return of the
person appointed to make such investigation, the court is satisfied that the provision
made by the testator for the widow or widower, in the will, is more valuable, it shall
record an entry that such widow or widower elects to take under the
will "
"Ohio General Code Section 10571 reads as follows: " If the widow or widower
fails to make such election in person within the time limit provided in this sec-
tion, then it shall be deemed that he or she has elected to take under the will and
he or she shall be bound accordingly
'Ambrose v. Rugg, Admx., 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N.E. 691 (1931)
"' Oi1o GEN. CODE § 10504-60.
17O8io GEN. CODE §§ 10504-60, 10504-63 and 10504-64.
"s 143 Ohio St. 294, 55 N.E.2d 262 (1944).
"In the Knoller case, the court was construing Section 10504-60 as effective in
1935. The current Section 10504-60 became effective Sept. 23, 1947 The provi-
sions of the two statutes as far as the present problem is concerned, are, however,
identical.
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Admx., but found the case inapposite due to the change in the statutory
law.2" The majority of the court felt that when Section 10504-60 was
viewed from its four corners, the intent of the legislature was that in case
of death the conclusive presumption applied -regardless of the reason for
non-election. "Inability to make the election is not a factor of controlling
importance," they felt, "for the applicable part of the statutory provision
applies to an insane as well as a sane person.'"
It is believed that the court made the only decision that could logically
be made in view of the factors that must be taken into consideration in
deciding the problem. The first of these is that by Sections 10504-63 and
10504-64, the legislature has provided that in case of a spouse under legal
disability the probate court has the authority to make the election for the
surviving spouse. While these provisions are, in effect, recognition of the
fact that the personal nature of the right of election should be qualified in
the event of legal disability, the consequence of such recognition is nothing
more than to give the court the right to do for the incompetent spouse that
which a competent spouse would have the right and ability to do for himself.
The court is merely the statutory agent of the spouse, with authority to
exercise the spouse's election rights-for Sections 10504-63 and 10504-64
cannot be interpreted as creating new and independent rights in the pro-
bate court.
If this is true, then whatever finally determines the right to elect in
the case of a competent spouse, should also determine the same right in
the case of an incompetent spouse. Section 10504-60, and its conclusive
presumption in case of death, is such a final determinant.
Also, while the result reached by the Ambrose case may have been
justified, perhaps, under the statutes existing at the time- for without
the express inclusion of the death provision the court could merely qualify
the extent of the personal nature of the right to elect -with the inclusion
of the conclusive presumption in case of death existing in Section 10504-60,
the entire rght to elect is taken away by death, regardless of the nature of
such rght.
Another inroad was made into the personal nature of the right of elec-
tion by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of Ralesgh v. Raletgh,22 decided
March 8, 1950. In that case the court held that the conclusive presumption
of Section 10504-60 is not applicable if the surviving spouse referred to
by the statute dies before the probate of the will of the deceased consort. It
was reasoned that since, by virtue of Ohio General Code Section 10504-55,
' See note 14, supra, and OMo GEN. CODE § 10504-60.
'In re Estate of Knofler, 143 Ohio St. 294, 301, 55 N.E.2d 262, 265 (1944).
'153 Ohio St. 160, 91 N.E.2d 241 (1950).
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election cannot be made until after the will is probated and the inventory,
appraisement, and schedule of debts filed, the surviving spouse who dies
before the deceased spouse's will is probated is not bound by the provisions
of Section 10504-60, and in such a case the probate court, under its equitable
powers, is authorized to make an election for the estate of the relict spouse.
While the decision is, perhaps, entirely correct in the light of the existing
statutes, it is most alarming in view of the fact that there is no apparent
time limit set by the court within which the heirs of the deceased relict must
petition the court to elect.23 It also produces the incongruous result that
whereas the surviving spouse is compelled by Section 10504-55 to act within
a definite time limit, the heirs of such relict are placed under no time limit
whatever.
The case clearly points out the existence of a situation that would seem
to call for prompt legislative action.
How Election is Made
The manner and form of making an election are regulated by Ohio
General Code Sections 10504-56 and 10504-62. The first section stipu-
lates that:
Whether or not a citation be issued, the election of the surviving spouse
shall be made in person, in the probate court of the proper county, except
as hereinafter provided.
And the second section provides the exception by stating that:
On an application in behalf of a surviving spouse, the probate court
may issue a commission directed to any suitable person, to take the
election of such spouse
Although the language of these sections dearly possesses a certain ex-
clusiveness, such legislative regulation of the manner and form of election
has never been regarded as completely mandatory by the Ohio Supreme
Court.2 4 The position has been taken that there may be an unplied election
arising from the conduct of the relict spouse. If the acts of the spouse
are of such nature as to establish an election in fact, he or she will be
estopped to deny that an election has not been made.
25
' That under certain circumstances the heirs may be estopped to deny election, how-
ever, see: Stockton v. Wooley, 20 Ohio St. 184 (1870).
'At least it has not been so regarded after 1856, when in Thompson v. Hoop, 6
Ohio St. 481 (1856), the inference in Stilley v. Folger, 14 Ohio 610 (1846), was
overruled.
' Colored Industrial School v. Bates, 90 Ohio St. 288, 107 N.E. 770 (1914); Mel-
linger v. Mellinger, 73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906); Posegate v. South, 46
Ohio St. 391, 21 N.E. 641 (1889); Millikin v. Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460 (1882);
Nimmons v. Westfall, 33 Ohio St. 213 (1877); Stockton v. Wooley, 20 Ohio St.
184 (1870); Baxter v. Bowyer, 19 Ohio St. 490 (1869); Gardner v. Gardner, 13
Ohio St. 426 (1862); Thompson v. Hoop, 6 Ohio St. 481 (1856); Ewalt v. Ames,
6 Ohio App. 374 (1917)
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The determination of just what acts of the widow or widower will be
held sufficient to create an equitable estoppel is a matter that does not
lend itself to precise defimtion.2-0 It does seem, however, that three condi-
taons are necessary before estoppel will be found: (1) the act or acts relied
upon as constituting an election by conduct must be plain and unequivocal;
(2) they must be done with a full knowledge of the rights under the
law respectively and of the true condition of the estate; and (3) they must
generally be of such long duration27 that an intent to make a specific choice
is dearly shown.28
Not only may the spouse be estopped to deny that he has not made an
election in fact, but if his conduct has been acquiesced in by the heirs and
legatees, these parties are mutually estopped to deny the electon.29
Whenever the conduct of the spouse is not sufficient for equitable
estoppel, however, it is submitted that Sections 10504-56 and 10504-62
are exclusive in respect to the manner and form of election that will be held
binding upon the relict spouse.
While the language of these sections alone would clearly appear to
prohibit election in any other manner, if further evidence of legislative in-
tent is felt necessary it may be found in the committee comment explain-
ing the omission in the current Probate Code of the provision which, prior
to the 1947 amendment, had permitted election to be made by written
instrument signed and acknowledged by the spouse s3 This provision was
omitted from the present Code because it was felt that such optional
method of election did not adequately safeguard the rights of the relict
spouse for the reason that there was no statutory requirement that when
"The fact that the current statutes (10504-56 and 10504-62) are more explicit on
the subject of the manner of election than were the statutes at the time when the
cases in note 25, supra, were decided should not affect the application of the doc-
trine of estoppel at the present time. The older election statutes were designed to
secure the spouse against an entry upon the record of an election until the fact of
such election should be clearly ascertained, and to require that it should be made
only upon full information and advice given the spouse as to his rights. The current
statutes make no change in this respect. (See OHio GEN. CODE §§ 10504-59 and
10504-62). If the spouse could be estopped under the former sections, the doctrine
should be applicable today. See Stockton v. Wooley, 20 Ohio St. 184, 186, (1870).
See Thompson v. Hoop, 6 Ohio St. 481 (1856), where real estate was devised to
a widow for life with a remainder in fee to her sons, and she in fact took under the
will and occupied the premises for more than stxeen years. She was estopped to
deny her election. Also, Stockton v. Wooley, 20 Ohio St. 184 (1870), where the
premises were occupied for more than eleven years and the estoppel doctrine was
applied.
'The Colored Industrial School v. Bates, 90 Ohio St 288, 296, 107 N.E. 770, 772
(1914); also, see Millikin v. Welliver, 27 Ohio St. 460 (1882).
nStockton v. Wooley, 20 Ohio St. 184 (1870).
See OHO GEN. CODE § 10504-56 as effective January 1, 1932.
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this method was used, an explanation be made of the rights of the spouse
under the will and by law."
Under both sections prescribing the manner of election in the current
Probate Code the legislature has expressly directed that the provisions of
the will, the rights, if any, under it, and the rights of the spouse under the
law be explained.32 If assurance that the relicts rights will be fully ex-
plained by a competent person was the foremost concern of the legislature
in providing for the present manner of election, only election made after
explanation by the court 3 or by someone appointed by the court should
suffice. This can be guaranteed only by the use of the procedure set out in
Sections 10504-56 and 10504-62.'4
Revocatton of Election
As a general proposition, once an election has been made and entered
upon the records of the probate court, it cannot be set aside.35 And this
is so even though the tune limit for making election has not expired.38
The rule is only applicable, however, when the election is made in the
absence of fraud and undue influence, and not as a result of ignorance or
mistake of material facts. If any of these elements are present and the
rights of innocent third parties will not be seriously affected, the election
may be set aside.37 And this may be done even after the time limit set by
statute for election has expired. 8
An action to have the election set aside must, however, be brought in
a court possessing general equity jurisdiction, such as the court of common
pleas 9 The probate court, being of limited jurisdiction and not possessing
mSee OHIO GEN. CODE (1949 Supp.) and the Committee comment following Sec-
tion 10504-56.
'See Ohio General Code Section 10504-59, which governs when the election is
made in person in the probate court, and Ohio General Code Section 10504-62,
which governs when the election is made before the person appointed by the court.
'See Mellinger v. Mellinger, 73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906), where it was
held, under a statute similar to current Sections 10504-56 and 10504-59, that the
dutes imposed upon the probate court were judicial and could not be performed
by a deputy derk of such court.
'Once the election is made by either of these two methods, it must be entered upon
the journal of the probate court OHIO GEN. CODE § 10504-55.
'Bell v. Henry, 121 Ohio St. 241, 167 N.E. 880 (1929); Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio
St. 386 (1860)
"Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386 (1860)
"Bell v. Henry, 121 Ohio St. 241, 167 N.E. 880 (1929); Mellinger v. Mellinger,
73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906); Millikin v. Welliver, 37 Ohio St. 460
(1882); Ohio Merchant's Trust Co. v. Conrad, 42 Ohio App. 150, 181 N.E. 274
(1931); see Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386 (1860).
'Mellinger v. Mellinger, 73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906).
'Bell v. Henry, 121 Ohio St. 241, 167 N.E. 880 (1929); Mellinger v. Mellinger,
73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906); Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386 (1860).
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general equity powers, has no authority to set aside the election once an
entry has been made. The court's dutes and authority terminate with the
entry, even though fraud or mistake might have been present 0
Due to the strictness of the statutes m regard to the manner of election
at the present time, and the requirement that the spouse be given a full
explanation of his rights,4 1 very few instances are likely to arise where suf-
ficient grounds for revocation will exist. Of course, if the court or the
person appointed to take the spouse's election fails to explain at all, or fully
or mistakenly explains the rights of the spouse under the law and by will,
and the interests of the relict are materially affected in an adverse manner,
the election may be set aside.4 2 It is earnestly suggested that if the spouses
interests are to be completely protected, counsel make certain that the
journal entry recording the election not only shows that an explanation was
made to the spouse as required by law, but also sets forth, specifically, all
that was said by the judge or person appointed by the court to take the
election of the spouse. If this is not done and the explanation was not of
the standard that it should have been, the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption that "everything is presumed to be rightly done and duly per-
formed until the contrary is shown '43 may be insurmountable.
Nature of the Right of Revocation
Since the right to elect is a personal right that can be exercised only by
the relict spouse, it would seem that the right to revoke the election should
also be a personal one, not exercisable by the heirs or personal representative
of the relict.
"Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386 (1860). While the statutes have been changed
since the decision in the Davis case, and since 1932 the Code has provided that
The probate court shall have plenary powers at law and in equity fully to dis-
pose of any matter properly before the court " (OHIo GEN. CODE § 10501-53)
it is not felt that the rule of the Davis case has been affected. Under § 10501-53,
the court is empowered to exercise thirteen items of specific jurisdiction and the
quoted section would appear to have to be read in the light of these thirteen items.
The only effect of the quoted material would seem to be a conferring of such mci-
dental powers in law and in equity as are necessary to carry the thirteen specific
powers therein conferred into effect. No part of Section 10501-53 makes any grant
of general jurisdiction such as would be necessary to enable the Davis rule to be
changed.
'See Omo GEN. CODE §§ 10504-56, 10504-59 and 10504-62.
"Mellinger v. Mellinger, 73 Ohio St. 221, 76 N.E. 615 (1906); Davis v. Davis, 11
Ohio St. 386 (1860). The fact that the spouse is not fully aware of his rights after
explanation will not prevent the election from being conclusive if the misapprehen-
sion is attributable solely to the spouse's own laches and indiscretion. Davis v.
Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386, 390 (1860). That greater caution should be exercised and
a fuller explanation made to a person of advanced age, see Bell v. Henry, 121 Ohio
St. 241, 167 N.E. 880 (1929).
"Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386, 389 (1860).
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While the Probate Code is silent and Ohio cases are non-existent on the
matter of revocation, such view is the logical one and has been adopted in
the majority of jurisdictions in which the problem has arisen. 4
Certainly in the case of a competent spouse, a third party should not be
permitted to have the election of the relict set aside without the consent of
the spouse, for even though fraud or imposition might have been present,
the election of the relict is only voidable and not void. If this were not
so, it would not be necessary to seek the aid of a court of general equity
jurisdiction to have the election set aside.45
The question of whether the spouse should be able to delegate his
powers of revocation to a duly authorized agent or attorney also arises.
While again no Ohio authority exists which specifically answers this ques-
tion, the legislature has provided in the case of initial election that the
election should be made in person.46 Such requirement would appear to
prohibit delegation by the spouse. If the right of election is so restricted,
there is no reason to allow greater latitude to the spouse in revoking an
election
It is not in the case of the competent spouse, however, that the real
difficulty occurs, for even though the right of revocation be held personal,
the spouse is not, because of such fact, precluded from having the initial
election set aside.
What, however, is going to be the position taken in the case of an
mncompetent spouse? For example, what is to be done in a case where
the spouse at the time of electing was competent, or where the spouse was
incompetent, and the election was made and duly entered by the court under
the authority of Ohio General Code Sections 10504-63 and 10504-64, and
where, in either instance, fraud or other sufficient grounds for revocation
existed? Once the election is recorded, the probate court has no authority
to set it aside on its motion or on that of any person. And, if the right
of revocation is strictly personal it could not, therefore, be exercised at all
in the use of the incompetent spouse.
Again, the Probate Code is silent on the matter and no cases exist in
which the problem has arisen. Since there are no statutory prohibitions
against allowing a petition for revocation to be filed by someone besides the
surviving spouse in cases of incompetency, however, a court of general
equity jurisdiction such as the comman pleas court would assuredly have
"Eltzroth v. Binford, 71 Ind. 455 (1880); Dolbeare v. Bowser, 254 Mass. 57, 149
N.E. 626 (1925); Stoepler v. Silberberg, 220 Mo. 258, 119 S.W 418 (1909);
Fergus v. Schiable, 91 Neb. 180, 135 N.W 448 (1912).
'See Davis v. Davis, 11 Ohio St. 386 (1860) where it was held that relief can only
be had in equity.
"OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-56.
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the authority to set the election aside if it so desired. After all, the legisla-
ture, through Ohio General Code Section 10504-63, has qualified the per-
sonal nature of election in cases of incompetents, and there would appear
no reason for the Ohio Supreme Court not to allow judicial qualification
under such circumstances, "7 at least to the extent of permitting the guardian
of the spouse to penton the common pleas court to have the election set
aside. To allow this would not place the rights of the relict in the hands of
the guardian other than to allow hun to file a petition asking for revocation,
for, if the election is set aside, the matter would then come within Ohio
General Code Sections 10504-63 and 10504-64, and the probate judge
would be the one to determine the rights of the spouse from that time on.
Effect of Electon to take under the Will
(a) In Testate Property
Under the current Probate Code, Section 10504-61, election by a surviv-
ing spouse to take in accordance with the will of the deceased consort
limits the relicts share in the property passing by will to the provisions
made for the relict, if any, in such will " unless it plainly appears from
the will that the provision therein for the spouse was intended to be in
addition to an intestate share."48
In cases where provision has been made in the will for the relict, and
the exception does not apply, the spouse electing to take under the will,
therefore, receives the share of real and personal property given her in the
will, and can obtain no part of the property bequeathed or devised to other
beneficiaries under the will And, even if no provision for the relict has
been made in the will of the deceased consort, the relict is still barred from
taking any part or share of the property passing under the will4 9 if he does
not elect to take by law instead of under the will.
No other conclusion could be reached under the present code, for Sec-
tion 10504-55 provides for the issuance of a citation to elect in all cases
where there is a will, and is not limited merely to instances where provision
"'Twice before when the Ohio Supreme Court had such a chance it very zealously
acted. See Raleigh v. Raleigh, 153 Ohio St. 160, 91 N.E.2d 241 (1950); Ambrose
v. Rugg, Admx., 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N.E. 691 (1931).
' Effective Aug. 22, 1941.
"The statements made in Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St. 330, 34 N.E. 166 (1893);
Coon v. DeMoore, 2 Ohio C. C. (N.S.) 444, 15 Ohio C. Dec. 776 (1903), Aff'd
Mem. Sub. Nom. Coon v. Coon, 71 Ohio St. 537, 74 N.E. 1134 (1905); and Iure
Davis, 12 Ohio C. Dec. 29 (1901), to the effect that, where no provision is made
in the will for the relict, the relict has the same rights as if the decedent had died
intestate, cannot be cited as authoritative under the present Code. They were de-
cided under a statute which required a citation to elect to be issued only when pro-
vston had beet; made rn the will for the relict and the question was: when no pro-
vision has been made, could the relict ever obtain a share of the property? Today,
a citation must be issued in all cases. OHo GEN. CODE § 10504-55.
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is made for the spouse in the will; 0 Section 10504-60 provides for a con-
clusive presumption of election to take under the will in all cases where
an actual election is not made, and Section 10504-61 is unambiguous and
admits of no limitations.r
Whether provision is made for the relict in the will or not, however,
unless the will expressly directs otherwise, such election shall not
bar the right of the surviving spouse to remain in the mansion of the de-
ceased consort, or to clamn and receive the property, or money in lieu there-
of, not to be deemed assets of the estate for administration, as provided
by law, nor the right of the widow to receive the statutory allowance for
the support of herself and her children'
(b) In Intestate Property
Although the question of whether a spouse who elects to take under the
will is barred of an intestate share in property not passing under the will,
in cases of partial testacy, has been answered both affirmatively and nega-
tively at different times in the past, 3 the present statute clearly gives the
surviving spouse a share in intestate property in such cases. Ohio General
Code Section 10504-61, as effective August 22, 1941, states that:
Such election, however, shall not bar the right of the surviving spouse
to an intestate share of that portion, if any, of the estate as to which the
decedent dies intestate.
No attempt at evasion as, for example, an express stipulation by the
testator in the will that if the relict accepts the provision in the will, he
shall thereby be barred of an intestate share in property not disposed of by
the will, should be successful.
The decedent dies either testate or intestate in regard to specific prop-
"As was the case when the Doyle and Coon cases, supra, note 49, were decided.
""If the surviving spouse elects to take under the will, such spouse shall be thereby
barred of all right to an intestate share of the property passing under the will, and
shall take under the will alone.
"Ortlo GEN. CoD § 10504-61.
'Upon construction of the statutes in existence at the time the decisions were ren-
dered, the question was answered: (1) negatively in Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505
(1863) (as to personality only); see Carder v. Fayette County, 16 Ohio St. 353
(1865); (2) affirmatively in Jones v. Webster, 133 Ohio St. 492, 14 N.E.2d 928
(1938); Swihart v. Swihart, 7 Ohio C.C. 338, 4 Ohio C. Dec. 624 (1893); see
Corry v. Lamb, 45 Ohio St. 203, 12 N.E. 660 (1887) (realty).
" In general, any property not disposed of by will is "intestate" property. Gardner
v. Gardner, 13 Ohio St. 426 (1862); also, see: Goff v. Moore, 3 Ohio App. 170,
Aff'd wnthout opnion Sub. Nom. Gregg v. Keener, 91 Ohio St. 406, 110 N.E. 1060
(1914); Holmden v. Craig, 16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 157, 31 Ohio C. Dec. 461
(1909), Aff'd without opinion 83 Ohio St. 483, 94 N.E. 1108 (1910); Geiger
v. Bitzer, 80 Ohio St. 65, 88 N.E. 134 (1909), Bowen v. Bowen, 38 Ohlo St. 426
(1882); Gilpin v. Williams, 25 Ohio St. 283 (1874); Dittoe v. Cluny, 22 Ohio
St. 436 (1872); Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio St. 56 (1871); Gilpin v. Williams,
17 Ohio St. 397 (1867).
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erty, and Section 10504-61 " governs the course of each piece of property in
accordance with the category the property falls into. Not being dispositve
in nature, any attempted "disinheritance" of the relict as to property not
disposed of by will, should not alter the character of the decedent's estate
or the relicts rights.
The discussion has been limited so far to property in which the decedent
possessed an unencumbered inheritable or distributable interest, or both, at
the time of death. The rights of the surviving spouse in relation to property
coming within this category are completely covered and controlled by Ohio
General Code Section 10504-61.
What, however, are the rights of the relict under the Probate Code in
regard to property in which at some time during coverture the decedent
possessed an unencumbered, inheritable or distributable interest, but which
at the time of death was no longer possessed by the deceased, or, although
still possessed was encumbered by mortgage or other lien?
As far as the personal estate is concerned, it has generally been assumed
that either spouse has absolute domimon over his personal property during
his life and may by a bona fide, completely executed inter-vivos transaction
deprive the other of all share in such property. The reason for the disposi-
tion of the property is immaterial and the disposition cannot be in fraud of
the other spouse's rights, for no rights of the other in the property exist.ar
Whether election is made to take under the will or not, as far as the share
of the relict is concerned, no problem can arise from the disposition or en-
cumbrance of personal property during the decedent's life.
In the case of real property, however, once one is seized of an estate of
inheritance at any time during marriage, the dower statute" comes into
play and such property cannot be conveyed away or encumbered so as to
defeat the rights of the spouse of the grantor unless the rights of such spouse
have been barred or relinquished. "' While the Probate Code expressly
declares that dwelling in adultery, 60 divorce,68 or the acceptance of a con-
'As effective Aug. 22, 1941.
"For a statement of such principle, see: Oglesbee v. Miller, 111 Ohio St. 426, 145
N.E. 846 (1924); Matthews v. KrIsher, 59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N.E. 52 (1899); Bane
v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505 (1863); Crane v. Doty, 1 Ohio St. 279 (1853); City
Trust & Say. Bank v. Hanley, 17 Ohio App. 467 (1923); Leopold v. Weaver, 9
Ohio App. 379 (1918).
" See: Neville v. Sawicki, 146 Ohio St. 539, 67 N.E.2d 323 (1946); Mark v. Mark,
145 Ohio St. 301, 61 N.E.2d 595 (1945); Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 144 Ohio
St. 195, 58 N.E.2d 381 (1944); Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St. 330, 34 NYE. 166
(1893); Rose v. Rose, 34 Ohio App. 89, 170 N.E. 181 (1929); Hayes v. Lind-
quist, 22 Ohio App. 58, 153 N.E. 269 (1926).
u' OHIo GEN. CODE § 10502-1.
'Neville v. Sawicki, 146 Oluo St. 539, 67 N.E.2d 323 (1946).
SOmoI GEN. CODE § 10502-5.
'
1 Oio GEN. CODE § 10502-1.
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veyance in lieu of dower 6 2 will effect such bar,"- and while it is most proba-
ble that Ohio General Code Section 10503-17 would bar a spouse convicted
of murdering the decedent from receiving dower, no other provision exists
that might affect the problem unless it is Ohio General Code Section
10504-61.
If the surviving spouse elects to take under the will, such spouse shall
be thereby barred of all right to an intestate share of the property passing
under the will, and shall take under the will alone, unless it plainly appears
from the will that the provision therein for the spouse was intended to be
in addition to an intestate share. Such election, however, shall not bar the
right of the surviving spouse to an intestate share of that portion, if any,
of the estate as to which the decedent dies intestate; and, unless the will
expressly otherwise directs, such election shall not bar the right of the
surviving spouse to remain in the mansion of the deceased consort, or to
claim and receive the property, or money in lieu thereof, not to be deemed
assets of the estate for administration, as provided by law, nor the right of
the widow to receive the statutory allowance for the support of herself and
children.
Whether this provision might affect the problem would appear to de-
pend upon the meamng of the phrase " and shall take under the will
alone ," and upon the applicability of the maxim expressio unus est ex-
clus alterias as a result of the enumerated exceptions appearing after the
restricting phrase. If the phrase" and shall take under the will alone "
does not have an independent meaning in addition to emphasizing the
phrase immediately preceding it, and if the statute read as a whole does not
limit the surviving spouse's interest in property -other than that given the
relict by will - to the property expressly mentioned in the exceptions, the
dower rights of the survivor would not be affected by Section 10504-61.
For this section would then regulate only the relicts interests in testate and
ntestate property. It would affect the interests of a relict spouse only in
regard to the survivor's assertion of rights as an heir or a devisee and not
interests in which the relicts claim is that of a widow or widower under
the dower statute. For example, suppose the decedent, during coverture
and without the consort's release, made an absolute conveyance of Black-
'2Orno GEN. CODE § 10502-2.
'The spouse also is barred of dower in land sold for taxes. See OHIo GEN. CODE
§ 10502-1(b) And in land dedicated or appropriated to public use. Long v.
Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N.E. 161 (1919); Gwynne v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio 24,
17 Am. Dec. 576 (1827) Estoppel by judgment bars Dower, Juliet v. Julier, 62
Ohio St. 90, 56 N.E. 661 (1900) Where consort exchanges one tract of land for
another, his spouse must elect in which tract she is to have dower. Fleming v.
Morningstar, 4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 405 (1904), affd without opimon 3 Ohio Law
Rep. 21 (Cir. Ct.) aff'd without opmion 72 Ohio St. 647, 76 N.E. 1124 (1905);
McArthur v. Porter, 1 Ohio 99 (1823) A deed of a husband and wife executed
for a sufficient consideration and invalid only by reason of its being an attempt to
defraud the husband's creditors bars wife's dower in the land thus deeded. Wood-
worth v. Paige, 5 Ohio St. 71 (1855) See also, OHIO GEN. CODE §§ 10105 and
12025.
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acre to X, mortgaged the premises to X, defaulted and lost Blackacre by
reason of foreclosure and sale; or lost all interest in the property as a result
of a judicial sale." In all these instances, the decedent possessed no in-
heritable estate or interest in Blackacre at the time of death-in fact, he
possessed no interest at all. Consequently, Blackacre could be neither tes-
tate nor intestate property in the estate of the decedent. There would be,
therefore, as far as any interest in Blackacre is concerned, a lack of subject
matter to which the provisions of Section 10504-61 could be applied.
It is submitted, however, that the phrase " and shall take under the
will alone "not only emphasizes the first part of the statute relating only
to testamentary property; it also has an independent meamng which can
admit of only one interpretation -that of barring all interest of the relict
in property disposed of or encumbered during the life of the decedent
without the relict's release, unless the interest be one of those enumerated
in the latter portion of the statute. Dower rights are not one of those set
out. The expression of exceptions65 and the fact that dower is not one of
them would seem further substantiation of the thesis that election to take
under the will bars any dower rights the relict spouse would otherwise have
in the estate of the decedent.66
(b) Election to Take Against the Will
In Ohio at the present time it is axiomatic that neither spouse can be
precluded from sharing in property of the other, real or personal, in which
the latter, upon death, possessed an inheritable or distributable estate. No
matter what disposition is made by the will of the deceased spouse, the
relict is given the unrestricted right either to abide by the testamentary
provisions or to reject them and take the share given by law. This is
guaranteed by Ohio General Code Section 10504-55, which provides that:
the probate court shall issue a citaton to the surviving spouse
to elect whether to take under the will or under the statute of descent
and distribution
(a) Size of the Share
A relict who elects to take under the statute of descent and distribution
will, of course, take an intestate share in both testate and intestate property.
" Other than a tax sale.
'See the importance placed upon the enumeration of the exceptions in Ohio Gen-
eral Code Section 10504-61 by the Ohio Supreme Court in Jones, Admx. v. Webster,
133 Ohio St. 492, 14 NE.2d 928 (1938).
It is recognized that the only case authority that can be found has barred a spouse
electing to take under the will from also claiming dower. See Corry v. Lamb, 45
Olo St. 203, 12 N.E. 660 (1887). The statute under which the case was decided,
however, left room for no other decision. It stated: " If she elected to take under
the will, she shall be barred of her dower and such share, and take under the will
alone . "
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The maximum amount that a relict can take, under any circumstances,
however, is a share " not to exceed one-half of the net estate." 7  As a
result of this provision, the question for determination then becomes
whether the restriction applies to both testate and intestate property of the
deceased consort.
In regard to testate property, it appears settled that the surviving spouse
is bound by the limitation and can receive no more than one half of the
property.6
In regard to intestate property, that is, property not effectively dis-
posed of in any manner by will, only one reported case can be found that
has construed the "one half" limitation. That is the case of Goodfellow v.
Wilson, decided in 1940."9 In this instance, the testator died leaving no
children or parents and no relatives closer than second cousins; so, had he
died completely intestate, the relict spouse, as heir under Ohio General
Code Section 10503-4(4), would have been entitled to all of the property.
The widow, after electing to take under the statute of descent and distribu-
tion, contended that the "one half" limitation, set out in Section 10504-55,
referred only to testate property and restricted the share that she took in
property which had been disposed of by the will of her consort, but that
it did not govern property as to which there was actual intestacy. The
court agreed, and by syllabus stated that:
The purpose of that part of sec. 10504-55 G.C., stating that in the
event of election to take under the statute of descent and distribution "such
spouse shall take not to exceed one-half of the net estate" is to limit a
widow who declines to take the provision made by her husband to not
more than one-half of the estate in lieu of the provision made for her in
the rejected will, relates entirely to testamentary disposition of estates and
does not limit the widow's rights to intestate property by virtue of sec.
10503-4(4) G.C.
The majority of the court felt that any other decision would be contrary to
legislative intent in that it would repeal in part the provisions of Section
10503-4 and change the devolution of property through an act of a disap-
pointed spouse rather than by the act of the testator himself.
The court also placed great emphasis upon the statement made in the
ITOHio GEN. CODE § 10504-55. For example, if the relict fell within either cate-
gory of classification (4) of 10503-4, an election to take against the will would
restrict the spouse to one half by virtue of Ohio General Code Section 10504-55. It
must be remembered, however, that 10504-55 only restricts -it does not increase.
If the relict were only entitled to one third under 10503-4 because of falling under
classification (3) of 10503-4, he would not receive one half under 10504-55.
'Barlow v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 61 N.E.2d 603
(1945); Davidson v. Trust Co. 129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N.E. 845 (1935); Miller
v. Miller, 129 Ohio St. 230, 194 N.E. 450 (1935); In re Estate of Ellis, 66 Ohio
App. 121, 32 N.E.2d 23 (1940); Shearn v. Shearn, 60 Ohio App. 317, 21 NE.2d
133 (1937)
Goodfellow v. Wilson, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 569 (1940)
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case of Mathews v. Krsher:70 'The statute of descent operates upon all
intestate property, and the course which it indicates can be changed only by
a testamentary disposition."'7u
It is true that to restrict the relict to one half of all the net estate would
in part repeal the statute of descent and distribution. To presume, how-
ever, that such effect could not have been intended by the legislature seems
questionable. Might not the legislature have intended that a spouse should,
but for a certain share of his property which ought to be preserved for his
relict, be allowed to dispose of his property exactly as he sees fit, and that,
so long as the relict spouses share is guaranteed, then the testator's wishes
and scheme of disposition should be given effect as fully as possible? In
other words, might not the legislature have been attempting to arrive at
a satisfactory accord between the principle of carrying out the testator's
desires as completely as possible and the contrary doctrine of allowing a
spouse by election to disrupt that scheme, by effecting a scheme that would
assure the relict a definite share and yet disrupt the shares of the devisees
and legatees as little as possible?
Under the rule laid down in the Goodfellow case the testamentary
scheme will, in most cases, be subject to great disturbance. For example,
suppose that the testator dies possessed of an estate of $50,000. He leaves
nothing to his wife, $10,000 to X, and $10,000 to Y, and dies intestate as
to the remaining $30,000. If the wife takes against the will and falls into
a classification under Section 10503-4 where, had the consort died wholly
intestate, she would have inherited all the estate, she will take one half
of the sums bequeathed to X and Y, which will be $10,000, and all of the
remaining $30,000. If, however, the "one half" restriction of Section
10504-55 were construed as applying to all the estate, both testate and in-
testate, the relict would receive $25,000, X and Y $10,000 each, and the
remaining $5,000 would descend to the next of kin of the decedent, or, in
an appropriate case, might even escheat to the state.
While the idea of the possibility of an escheat to the state is generally
repulsive as far as the relict spouse is concerned - is not the idea of auto-
matically cutting all the bequests in half, with no possibility of recoupment
or contribution from any source, just as repulsive from the point of view of
the legatee or devisee! And certainly, in a case like the one assumed, the
testator has shown his intent to prefer these others to his consort.
I do not profess to know what the legislative intent was at the time of
the passage of Ohio General Code Section 10504-55, but it is dear that
7°59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N.E. 52 (1898).
21While there was no election in the Matthews case, it was held that a widow who
had been given a life estate by her deceased husband's will also took the remainder
in fee as an heir, such remainder being undisposed of by the will and no issue of the
husband being involved.
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under either of the above rules inequitable results are going to result m
some instances. Merely because equitable principles might have favored the
rule adopted in the light of the facts in the Goodfellow case, however, does
not absolutely establish that it was the legislative intent to adopt the view
advanced in that case.
Clearly the legislature has the power to define the extent to which a
relict may share in property of the deceased consort when an election is
made.72 The whole matter seems simply to be one of statutory construc-
tion and interpretation. The language of Ohio General Code Section
10504.55 seems definite and unrestricted on its face.
The fact that the "one half" limitation occurs within the chapter of the
statutes entitled "Wills" would seem of little significance in construing
it, for even if it was the purpose of the legislature to apply the limitation to
the entire estate, what better chapter could it appear in? For it purports
to regulate the rights of a relict taking against a will.
Also, cases like Mathews v. Kfzsheir7 3 -cases in which the question was
not whether after taking against the will a share could be had in intestate
property, but whether after electing to take under the will an intestate
share could also be taken - would not seem to control the problem under
discussion. After all, the testamentary intent and scheme of disposition is
not disturbed at all by allowing a relict to take intestate property after
electing to abide by the terms of the will.
Therefore, Section 10504-61, which simply settles the Mathews v.
Krtsher question by permitting the relict who elects to take under the will
to take also an intestate share in intestate property, would likewise not
appear to affect the problem under discussion. The situations and problems
in the event of election to take under the will are too dissimilar from those
presented in an instance of election against the will to apply axiomatically
the reasoning in the one type of case to the other.74
It should also be remembered that when Matthews v. Krzsher was de-
cided election by a surviving spouse was a choice between the relicts rights
as a widow or widower and his rights as a devisee or legatee, and not be-
tween his rights as heir and as legatee or devisee, which is the case today.
Another point upon which the majority of the court relied in the
See: State ex Taylor v. Gilbert, 70 Ohio St. 229, 71 N.E. 636 (1904); and Carder
v. Board of Commissioners, 16 Ohio St. 354 (1865)
7359 Ohio St. 562, 53 N.E. 52 (1898)
u It is felt that cases decided under statutes prior to the "one half" restriction of
Ohio General Code Section 10504-55 are not controlling under the present statute,
due to the difference in wording of the statutes. Under prior statutes, two cases are
in agreement with the results of the Goodfellow case, and one is contra. In agree-
ment: Armstrong v. Armstrong, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 474, 21 Ohio C. Dec. 261
(1907); March v. McClintic, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 413 (1907); 34 Ohio C. Dec.
655. Contra: Zizelman v. Mayer, 27 Ohio App. 512, 161 N.E. 550 (1927).
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Goodfellow case was the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of
Miller -v. Miller,75 had laid down the general principle that Section 10504-55
does not mean that the surviving spouse takes under the statute of descent
and distribution, but that the statute of descent and distribution is merely
defimtive or descriptive of the size of the share to be taken by the surviving
spouse, and that the actual taking of the share by the surviving spouse is
under Section 10504-55. The full import of such construction is that the
relicts rights under Ohio General Code Section 10504-55 are considered to
be those of a widow or widower and not those of an heir, and that Section
10503-4 alone creates the latter. As a consequence, the election by a relict
involves only a choice between the relicts rights as a devisee or legatee and
those of a widow or widower under Section 10504-55, and not a choice be-
tween the rights of a devisee or legatee and those of an heir under Section
10504-3. Under the old law prior to 1932 this was undoubtedly true.6 In
Barlow v. Winters Natzonal Bank,77 which was decided in 1945, however,
the nature of the relicts rights under Section 10504-55 was held to be that
of an heir. The court stated:
Where the relict of a deceased husband elects not to take under his
will, she takes her share not by way of a distributive share in money, but
by way of inheritance as though it came to her from her deceased husband
as an estate under Section 10503-4, General Code, limited by the provi-
sion of Section 10504-55, General Code.
(Italics added.)
If Ohio General Code Section 10504-55 places the spouse absolutely
under the statute of descent and distribution, the Miller case is overruled,
and election then is a choice between the relict's rights as an heir and his
rights of a devisee or legatee. Also, since the "one half" limitation existing
in Section 10504-55 is meamngless unless it applies to all property that
the relict takes by virtue of Section 10503-4, the authority of Goodfellow v.
Wilson is npliedly overruled.
In any event, it is doubtful whether the court in the Goodfellow case
was justified in relying upon the Miller case to reach the result that it did,
no matter what type of rights Section 10504-55 created in the surviving
spouse, for the Miller case also held that: "By its terms this section (10503-
129 Ohio St. 230, 194 N.E. 450 (1935).
Ogelsbee v. Miller, 111 Ohio St. 426, 145 N.E. 846 (1924); Matthews v. Krisher,
59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N.E. 52 (1898); Doyle v. Doyle, 50 Ohio St. 330, 34 N.E.
166 (1893); Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C.C. 570, 3 Ohio C. Dec. 589 (1892) aff'd
without opinion 53 Ohio St. 679, 44 N.E. 1137 (1895); Carder v. Commissioners,
16 Ohio St. 354 (1865); Bane v. Wick, 14 Ohio St. 505 (1863); Gardner v. Gard-
ner, 13 Ohio St. 426 (1862); Crane v. Dory, 1 Ohio St. 279 (1853). The only
case contra is Zizelman v. Mayer, 27 Ohio App. 512, 161 N.E. 550 (1927).
' Barlow v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 61 N.E.2d
603 (1945).
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4) is limited to the distribution of property when its owner dies intestate.""
In the Goodfellow case the decedent did not die intestate, although some of
his estate passed as intestate property.
No matter which of the two ways the supreme court may see fit to decide
the problem presented by the Goodfellow case, it seems that such great
hardship as may be imposed upon the legatees and devisees under the
Goodfellow construction because of the taking of one half of their bequests
or devises without any chance of recoupment from any source -and the
possibility of escheat to the state under the contrary construction, are suffi-
ciently serious to warrant reconsideration of the entire problem by the
legislature with, at least, a view toward the drafting of legislation elimi-
nating the evils in the specific instance where, but for the limitation imposed
by Ohio General Code Section 10504-55, the surviving spouse would have
been entitled under the statute of descent and distribution to the entire
estate. For example if it were provided that:
In the event of election to take under the statute of descent and distri-
bution the surviving spouse shall not take more than one-half of the net
estate, except that if the relict would have been entitled to all of the estate
under the statute of descent and distribution had the decedent died intes-
tate, then, if property remains after provision has been made for the sur-
viving spouse to the extent of one half of the net estate and after com-
plete compensation of affected devisees and legatees, such remaining prop-
erty shall descend and be distributed to the surviving spouse. The "one
half" limitation shall apply to both testate and intestate property,
the surviving spouse would be assured of a minimum of one half of the
property of the consort, the legatees and devisees would be assured of their
complete shares as designated in the will, if sufficient property remains
after the relict's share is taken out, and the relict would not be put in the
position of losing property to distant relatives who would not have shared
in the estate had the decedent died wholly intestate, or of having the
property escheat to the State of Ohio.
Net Estate and Debts
While it has not been expressly settled by the Ohio Supreme Court
whether the "one half" provision in Section 10504-55 applies to intestate
property, it has been decided that the term "net estate" as used in Section
10504-55 is that portion of the estate which is left after the payment
of the decedent's debts, costs of administration, the statutory exemption
created by Section 10509-55, and the widow's statutory allowance under
Section 10509-74.PM
'
8Miller v. Miller, 129 Ohio St. 230, 235, 194 N.E. 450, 452 (1935).
'Barlow v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 61 N.E.2d 603
(1945); Davidson v. Trust Co., 129 Ohio St. 418, 195 N.E. 845 (1935); Miller
v. Miller, 129 Ohio St. 230, 194 N.E. 450 (1935).
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Dssposaton of the Share Rejected by the Spouse
If provision has been made in the will of the testator for the surviving
spouse and the relict elects to take under the law, the question then arises
as to the disposition of the rejected portion. If there are legatees and
devisees whose interests have been diminished as a result of the relices
election, the interest which the relict renounces is ordinarily used to com-
pensate these disappointed beneficiaries.8 0
While in most cases there will be nothing left after the legatees and
devisees whose shares were diminished as a result of the election have been
compensated, there will be some instances in which property does remain.
When this occurs the problem of how and to whom this property should be
distributed arises. In the absence of a residuary clause, or any testamentary
provision covering such contingency, the property in regard to heirs in
general is disposed of in accordance with the statute of descent and distri-
bution.1s  Whether the relict spouse who has elected to take against the
will can take a share of such rejected property 2 has never been clear in
Ohio. Under the laws prior to the passage of the present Probate Code,
contrary opinions were reached. In the case of Armstrong v. Armstrong,
the relict spouse was not allowed to share as an heir in such rejected prop-
erty. 3 In March v. McClintc,s4 however, the court was of the opinion
that the surviving spouse would receive such a share under the statute of
descent and distribution.
The only case decided under the present Probate Code that involved the
problem was Goodfellow v'. Wilson, in which the relict was, of course,
given all the property in the estate of her deceased husband.85 It would
'See: Dunlap v. McCloud, 84 Ohio St. 272, 95 N.E. 774 (1911); Holdren v.
Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N.E. 537 (1908); Jennings v. Jennings, 21 Ohio
St. 56 (1871); Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C.C. 570, 3 Ohio C. Dec. 589 (1892). This
does not mean that the relict, in rejecting the bequest or devise to her in the will by
electing to take under the law, forfeits all right to receive a share in the property
willed to her. The relict shares in this property by virtue of Section 10504-55, to
the same extent that she shares in any other property deemed assets of the decedents
estate for the purposes of administration. See Barlow v. Winters National Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 61 N.E.2d 603 (1945).
'Wilson v. Hall, 6 Ohio C.C. 570, 3 Ohio C. Dec. 569 (1892); aJI'd wthout
optnton 53 Ohio St. 679, 44 N.E. 1137 (1895); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 11 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 474, 21 Ohio C. Dec. 261 (1907).
Property which is now intestate property as a direct result of the relict's election.
S21 Ohio C. Dec. 261 (1907), although the spouse was permitted to inherit other
intestate property. See: Wilson v. Hall, supra note 81.
8434 Ohio C. Dec. 655 (1907)
Although it is not specifically stated that the relict took such rejected share, the
language of the case is broad enough to allow it, and there were provisions in the
testator's will giving the wife certain personal effects, and it was decided that all the
property in the estate went to the relicts wife.
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appear that the only question here, as in the case of intestacy in regard to
property which did not become intestate property as a result of the rejec-
tion by the legatee or devisee, should be whether Ohio General Code Sec-
tion 10504-55, and its "one half' limitation, applies only to property effec-
tively disposed of by will or whether the limitation applies to the entire estate
left by a decedent, whether the property be testate or intestate. To hold
under the present statute, as it was held in the Armstrong case,8 6 that the
relict can inherit intestate property if the intestacy was not the result of
the relicts rejection of the will, but cannot inherit the property if the
intestacy resulted from the refusal of the spouse to accept the share given
the spouse by the will, would be just as absurd today as it was then. The
majority of the court in the Armstrong case grounded its decision upon
the statement that the property bequeathed to the relict and rejected by her
does not become intestate property as to her " As to everyone
else, however, this same property was decided to be intestate property.
Never before has the writer seen attributed to property such chameleon
qualities. It is submitted that any given property is either testate or intestate
as to all parties. If it is intestate property, it descends to all heirs. The
relict is such an heir under the present Code,88 and, unless restricted by the
"one half" limitation of Section 10504-55, should logically share in such
property just as any other heir. The "one half" limitation should apply to
the entire estate.
Nature of the Relict's Interest in Realty
An important question in the cases in which real property is involved
and the surviving spouse elects to take against the will of the deceased
consort is the nature of the interest acquired by the relict in such property.
Ohio General Code Section 10503-4 provides that:
When a person dies intestate having title or right to any real estate
or inheritance in this state such real estate or inheritance shall descend
and pass in parcenary.
And Ohio General Code Section 10504-55 gives the relict the right to take
either according to the provisions in the will or under Section 10503-4.
Upon reading these sections together, it would appear that the relict,
upon electing to take under the statute of descent and distribution, would
acquire a share and interest in the real property in parcenary and not merely
a distributive share, payable in money, in the net estate of the testator. And
' Armstrong v. Armstrong, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 474, 21 Ohio C. Dec. 261 (1907).
8T Ibu.
' Barlow v. Winters National Bank and Trust Co., 145 Ohio St. 270, 61 N.E.2d
603 (1945).
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this was the view adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Barlow v. Winters
Nattonal Bank and Trust Company. 9
Conclusion
While the rights of a surviving spouse in Ohio are, for the most part,
well defined, there are at least two important questions that have not been
resolved.
The first is whether a spouse electing to take under the will of the
deceased consort is also entitled to dower in the limited instances where
vested dower is retained in Ohio. While the problem has not been judicially
determined, there would appear reason to deny the relict the right to dower
in such cases, for the election statute, Ohio General Code Section 10504-61,
obviously purports to regulate the interests of the relict not only as a widow
or widower but also as an heir and as a devisee. The mandate of the
statute that a spouse electing to take under the will shall take under the
will alone except in certain enumerated cases precludes any other inter-
pretation, for cases involving dower are not among those enumerated.
The second problem not settled by the Ohio Supreme Court is whether
upon an election to take against the will where there is intestate property,
the "one half" limitation of the election statute applies to the intestate
property and effects a limitation of that property obtained by the spouse,
or whether the "one half" limitation applies only to limit the share taken
by the relict in the property passing by will of the deceased consort. Ohio
General Code Section 10504-55 seems plainly to limit the relict to "one
half" of the entire estate, and in the light of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in Barlow v. Winters National Bank & Trust Co. -to the effect
that the relict spouse is, upon election, actually placed within the operation
of the statute of descent and distribution -the "one half" limitation would
be meaningless unless applied to the entire estate.
Whichever of the two constructions is adopted by the Ohio Supreme
Court, however, the fact remains that, under such an inelastic "one half"
limitation, hardship is going to be worked either upon the relict or upon the
devisees or legatees in some instances in which the limitation is applicable.
It is therefore hoped that the Committee for Statute Revision will reinvestt-
gate the problem with the purpose of effecting a more elastic statute that
will better protect the interests of all parties in all the possible circumstances
that may arise.
lbu, For contrary holdings prior to the Barlow case, see: In re Estate of Ellis, 66
Ohio App. 121, 32 N.E.2d 23 (1940); Shearn v. Shearn, 60 Ohio App. 317, 21
NE. 2d 133 (1937).
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